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Andrew Flavelle Martin*

Law Society Regulation and the
Lawyer-Academic

Can, and should, law societies regulate and discipline lawyers for their teaching
and research? This article explores these largely overlooked but critically important
questions in order to establish a foundation for further debate and discussion by
lawyers, legislators, and law societies. It argues that professionalism precludes only
low-value teaching and research—teaching and research with little pedagogical or
epistemic value such that it is unlikely or unworthy to be protected by academic
freedom—and that any chilling effect on lawyer-academics comes as much
from uncertainty as from actual danger of regulatory consequences. The author
concludes that law societies and other stakeholders should engage in consultation
on these issues in the spirit of transparency and predictability. Indeed, even in the
absence of purported or actual exercise of regulatory powers, lawyer-academics
should embrace and aspire to their professional obligations in order to be better
teachers and researchers—and better role models for law students.

Les ordres professionnels de juristes peuvent-ils, et devraient-ils, réglementer
et discipliner les avocats pour leur enseignement et leur recherche? Cet article
explore ces questions largement négligées mais d’une importance critique afin de
jeter les bases d’un débat et d’une discussion plus approfondis entre les avocats,
les législateurs et les barreaux. Il soutient que le professionnalisme n’exclut que
l’enseignement et la recherche de faible valeur—’enseignement et la recherche
ayant peu de valeur pédagogique ou épistémique de sorte qu’il est peu probable
ou indigne d’être protégé par la liberté académique—et que tout effet dissuasif
sur les avocats-universitaires provient autant de l’incertitude que du danger réel
de conséquences réglementaires. L’auteur conclut que les ordres professionnels
de juristes et les autres parties prenantes devraient engager des consultations sur
ces questions dans un esprit de transparence et de prévisibilité. En effet, même
en l’absence d’exercice supposé ou réel de pouvoirs réglementaires, les avocatsuniversitaires devraient assumer leurs obligations professionnelles et y aspirer
afin d’être de meilleurs enseignants et chercheurs—et de meilleurs modèles pour
les étudiants en droit.

*
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to Nicole Arski for excellent research assistance and to the Hon. Robert Sharpe, Kim Brooks, Adam
Dodek, Brandon Trask, Agnieszka Doll, Jon Shapiro, Colin Jackson, Andrew Luesley, and Sara Seck
for comments on a draft.
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A is a professor at a leading Canadian law school. A is also licensed
as a lawyer in Ontario, although they are non-practicing. A authors an
article in a Canadian law journal in which A critiques the conduct of
Lawyer B in recent litigation and argues that Lawyer B has violated the
rules of professional conduct. A assigns this article as reading in their
seminar course and repeats the critique and conclusion during class.
B takes issue with the substance of the critique and the manner in which
it is expressed.
However, B declines to commence an action against A for defamation.
Instead, B files a complaint with the Law Society of Ontario alleging
that A in their research and teaching has violated their duty of civility,
their duty of competence, and their duty to encourage respect for the
administration of justice.
Could the Law Society of Ontario discipline A for their teaching and
research? Should it? Would it?
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Introduction
Two primary legal mechanisms constrain the teaching and research of
Canadian professors. The first is employment and career consequences
within the university. The other is civil liability, particularly in defamation.
The counterweight to the first is the concept of academic freedom and the
safeguards incorporated into collective bargaining, collective agreements,
and the grievance process. The counterweight to the second is institutional
defamation insurance, again within the collective bargaining and collective
agreement context.1 Neither of these counterweights are foolproof: even
if they operate as intended there can still be substantial distress and
imposition on the professor involved. But the legal issues involved are
fairly well understood.
Law professors are different in that those who are lawyers face a
potential third source of constraint: their professional obligations as
overseen and enforced by law societies. Among the three sources, this one
is the most amorphous and the least understood—despite its potentially
massive implications for legal education and the legal academy. There
are no reported disciplinary decisions concerning the teaching and
research of lawyer-academics. There is but one Canadian blog post that
recognizes the issue in passing.2 Two Canadian academic articles and one
book chapter at least feint in that direction.3 To my genuine surprise, this
issue seems largely ignored in the US.4 Canadian law professors who are
1.
But see e.g. Ameet Kaur Nagra, “A Higher Protection for Scholars Faced with Defamation
Suits” (2013) 41:1 Hastings Const LQ 175; Kate Sutherland, “Book Reviews, The Common Law Tort
of Defamation, and the Suppression of Scholarly Debate” (2010) 11:6 German LJ 656.
2.
Cameron Hutchinson, “What Happens if I Get Sued for Publishing My Research?” (17 March
2020), online (blog): Slaw <www.slaw.ca/2020/03/17/what-happens-if-i-get-sued-for-publishing-myresearch/> [perma.cc/8UKF-SZQF].
3.
FC DeCoste, “Howling at Harper” (2008) 58 UNB LJ 121 (“in our legal tradition, the law
school is a branch of the legal community, and the obligations of academic lawyers are constitutional
by origin and professional in nature (and, despite the inclinations of many law professors, stubbornly
so in both respects)” at 128); Bruce P Elman, “Creating a Culture of Professional Responsibility
and Ethics: A Leadership Role for Law Schools” (2009) 27 Windsor Rev Legal & Soc Issues 93
(“academic lawyers must be as committed to ethical practice as are members of the practicing bar”
at 105). Elman however goes on to focus on what might be described as professional and ethical
teaching); Jon Thompson, “Preface,” in James Turk, ed, Academic Freedom in Conflict: The Struggle
Over Free Speech Rights in the University (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 2014) 7 (“there are
professional codes of ethical conduct in disciplines ranging from medicine to mathematics” at 8).
4.
But see Robert R Kuehn, “A Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of Law Professors
to Speak Out” (2004) 55:2 South Carolina L Rev 253, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=621101> [perma.cc/232A-EA2J]; J Peter Byrne, “Academic Freedom and Political
Neutrality in Law Schools: An Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional Education” (1993)
43:3 J Legal Educ 315, online: <scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1575/> [perma.cc/79YNGV52] (“[p]rofessional ethical obligations attach to academic as well as to practicing lawyers”
at 329). With respect, and although I agree with his position, Byrne provides no analysis for this
assertion. See also “[a]n account of academic freedom for law schools that ignores our professional
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lawyers thus face massive uncertainty, particularly those that are idealistic
or risk-averse, or both. That uncertainty can and should be minimized if
not eliminated. I start that process here.
In this article, I consider the appropriate role for law society regulation
of lawyer-academics.5 I ultimately reach three core conclusions. First,
law society regulation, including the potential for discipline, constrains
only low-value teaching and research, by which I mean teaching and
research with little pedagogical or epistemic value such that it is unlikely
or unworthy to be protected by academic freedom. Second, regulation of
lawyer-academics is necessary for law societies to fulfill their mandate to
protect the public interest. Third, law societies should regulate lawyeracademics using the same rules and tests that apply to the professional
conduct of practicing lawyers. I build to some extent on my previous
work,6 though I refine my approach and revisit my assumptions. My goal is
not to end debate on this subject, but to catalyze it. My motivation is not to
increase the scope of regulation, but to identify and define—or encourage
the identification and definition—of a safe area for lawyer-academics to
operate within.7
My analysis is organized in five parts. I begin in Part I by explaining
my approach and the scope of my analysis. Then in Part II I assess the likely
impact of the law of lawyering, and specifically the rules of professional
conduct, on academic freedom. I focus on the three duties most likely to
be engaged by the teaching and research of lawyer-academics: the duty
to encourage respect for and improve the administration of justice, the
duty of civility, and the duty of competence. I argue that to the extent
that professionalism appears to potentially constrain academic freedom, it
obligations must become either a platitude or a denial of responsibility” (ibid at 339). See also Robert
Ashford, “Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities in Teaching Law-Related Economic
Issues” (2004) 41:1 San Diego L Rev 133, online: <digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol41/iss1/10/> [perma.
cc/5LLF-KAD5] (Ashford suggests that responsibilities of law teachers should be “informed” by the
“spirit” of the rules of professional conduct at 140-142); See also Nicola A Boothe-Perry, “The New
Normal for Educating Lawyers” (2016) 31:1 Brigham Young U J Pub L 53 (“[t]hose law professors
who are also members of a state bar are subject to the ethical rules that govern the relevant jurisdiction.
Law professors who are not bar members should nevertheless adhere to the ethical rules, in addition
to maintaining compliance with applicable professional standards” at 71. Unfortunately, Boothe-Perry
does not support or elaborate on these assertions).
5.
My focus in this article is on Canadian law. I thus do not address, for example, the situation of
a Canadian law professor who is licensed in a foreign jurisdiction. Neither do I address the issue of
whether a Canadian law society can discipline a person who is a lawyer in that Canadian jurisdiction
but a law professor in a foreign jurisdiction. I also do not address the responsibilities of Canadian
lawyer-academics in their research and teaching about foreign jurisdictions.
6.
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “The Limits of Professional Regulation in Canada: Law Societies and
Non-Practising Lawyers” (2016) 19:1 Legal Ethics 169, DOI: <10.1080/1460728x.2016.1188541>
[Martin, “Limits”].
7.
Thanks to Andrew Luesley for clarifying this point.
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constrains low-value teaching and scholarship. Part III considers the “can”
question, i.e. whether law societies can as a matter of law regulate and
discipline lawyer-academics for their teaching and research. I conclude
that they can. Part IV then turns to the dicier “should” question, i.e.
whether law societies should exercise those legal powers. I argue that
they should, but that the policy decision must be theirs alone in order to
preserve the independence of the bar. I then provide recommendations in
Part V. If nothing else, law societies should actively consider these issues
and provide guidance to lawyer-academics to dispel the current state of
uncertainty. Finally, I conclude the article by reflecting on the implications
of my analysis. Far from driving lawyer-academics out of the academy or
to surrender their licenses, a commitment to professional conduct should
improve both teaching and research.
I. My approach and the scope of my analysis
In this Part, I identify the scope of my analysis. I canvass here the key
concepts—teaching and research, lawyer-academics, academic freedom,
high-value versus low-value teaching and research—and explain two
undercurrents to my analysis.
I adopt a purposive but bounded definition of lawyer-academics
and their teaching and research activities. While I do not discount the
importance of clinical faculty, I recognize that their teaching certainly
constitutes the practice of law. Thus, law societies can and should
regulate, and discipline where necessary, clinical faculty in the same way
as they regulate other practicing lawyers, and so I do not consider them
further in my analysis.8 Neither do I consider, for those law professors
who practice part-time, their regulatory liability for such practice,9 or the
8.
But see e.g. in the US literature Robert R Kuehn & Peter A Joy, “Lawyering in the Academy:
The Intersection of Academic Freedom and Professional Responsibility” (2009) 59:1 J Leg Educ
97, online: <www.researchgate.net/publication/228298349_Lawyering_in_the_Academy_The_
Intersection_of_Academic_Freedom_and_Professional_Responsibility>
[perma.cc/TQP4-83DX];
Steven H Leleiko, “Opportunity to Be Different and Equal: An Analysis of the Interrelationships
between Tenure Academic Freedom and the Teaching of Professional Responsibility in Orthodox and
Clinical Legal Education” (1980) 55:4 Notre Dame L Rev 485, online: <scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/
vol55/iss4/2/> [perma.cc/9BM7-TYZW].
9.
But see e.g. in the US literature Jett Hanna, “Moonlighting Law Professors: Identifying
and Minimizing the Professional Liability Risk” (2001) 42:2 S Tex L Rev 421, DOI: <10.1111/
jlse.12014>; Michael H Hoeflich & J Nick Badgerow, “Law School Faculty, LLP: Law Professors
as a Law Firm” (2005) 53:4 U Kan L Rev 853, online: KU ScholarWorks <kuscholarworks.ku.edu/
handle/1808/6850?show=full> [perma.cc/3MYS-Z4PC]; Rory K Little, “Law Professors as Lawyers:
Consultants, of Counsel, and the Ethics of Self-Flagellation” (2001) 42:2 S Tex L Rev 345, online:
<repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/421/> [perma.cc/S9CP-GQSV]; Agnieszka McPeak,
“The Internet Made Me Do It: Reconciling Social Media and Professional Norms for Lawyers, Judges,
and Law Professors” (2019) 55:2 Idaho L Rev 205 at 217, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3418088> [perma.cc/98ZX-2ETY].
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regulatory implications for lawyer-professors who give legal advice to
their colleagues or students.10 Likewise, I do not propose or consider a
specific code of conduct for law professors or specific ethical issues that
face law professors,11 or a code of professional conduct for professors
more broadly.12 I orient my analysis around the activities of teaching and
research instead of drawing boundaries or distinctions among those who
engage in those activities. Thus, I do not distinguish among different kinds
of law professors—full-time versus part-time, adjunct, tenure-track, and
so on.13 I define legal academics as those who engage in teaching and
research.
While there are important debates to be had about the boundaries of
teaching and research,14 I do not attempt to resolve those debates here.
Instead, I consider those activities in the broadest sense. I explicitly
include what Craig Forcese terms “public engagement,” i.e. “instances
where professors engage a public beyond the confines of academia,”
such as government and civil society reports, op-eds, blogs, and social
media.15 As Cass Sunstein puts it, “One of the purposes of academic

10. See e.g. VA Legal Eth Op 1601 (Virginia Legal Ethics Opinions), 1999 WL 348740, online:
<www.vsb.org/docs/LEO/1601.pdf> [perma.cc/Y66L-NP6Y].
11. But see e.g. in the US literature Wilson Ray Huhn, “A Proposed Code of Ethics for Law
Educators” (1988) 6:1 JL & Religion 25, DOI: <10.2307/1051058>; Monroe H Freedman, “The
Professional Responsibility of the Law Professor: Three Neglected Questions” (1986) 39:2 Vand L
Rev 275, online: <scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/17/> [perma.cc/VEC5LRZD]; Lisa G Lerman, “First Do No Harm: Law Professor Misconduct toward Law Students”
(2006) 56:1 J Leg Educ 86, online: <scholarship.law.edu/scholar/242/> [perma.cc/4S39-BPSG];
Carol A Needham, “The Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors: The Scope of the Duty of
Confidentiality, Character and Fitness Questionnaires, and Engagement in Governance” (2006) 56:1
J Leg Educ 106; Deborah L Rhode, “The Professional Ethics of Professors” (2006) 56:1 J Leg Educ
70; Kimberly M Tatum & Susan W Harell “Ethical Issues Faced By the Dual Professional: Lawyers
as Faculty in Higher Education” (2007) 8:2 J College & Character 1, online: <www.degruyter.com/
document/doi/10.2202/1940-1639.1165/html> [perma.cc/YU3F-D4NF]. In the Canadian context, see
Kevin Mackinnon, “The Academic as Fiduciary: More Than a Metaphor?” (2007) 2007 CLEAR 1.
12. See e.g. Neil W Hamilton, “Academic Tradition and the Principles of Professional Conduct”
(2001) 27:3 J College & University L 609.
13. I recognize that these differences may have implications for academic freedom in the context
of the university. See e.g. J Peter Byrne, “Academic Freedom of Part-Time Faculty” (2001) 27:3
J College & University L 583, online: <scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1690/> [perma.
cc/26GN-HHRT].
14. See e.g. Craig Forcese, “The Expressive University: The Legal Foundations of Free Expression
and Academic Freedom on Canada’s Campuses” (2021) online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3850321> [perma.cc/F4E6-VCYC] (“‘[a]cademic freedom’ is a common term on
Canada’s university campuses with a long pedigree, but its content is poorly understood and there is
remarkably little detailed treatment of the concept in the legal literature or caselaw. Indeed, there is
considerable uncertainty about the concept’s scope even in academia” at 25 [citations omitted]).
15. Craig Forcese, “The Law Professor as Public Citizen: Measuring Public Engagement in Canadian
Common Law Schools” (2015) 36 Windsor Rev Legal & Soc Issues 66 at 70.
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freedom is to permit professors to speak publicly without fear of reprisal,
and those who write op-eds or publish with a trade press are doing what
academic freedom is designed to permit them to do.”16 Similarly, social
media can be a valuable tool for engagement with the public.17 However,
where lawyers represent themselves in court in matters connected to their
research interests,18 I consider that to be practice and thus the typical rules
for practicing lawyers would apply.
The scope of the concept of “academic freedom” is key to my analysis.
Academic freedom has two kinds of meanings. One is the autonomy of
the university to govern itself.19 My focus is on the other meaning, i.e.
the ability of professors to teach and research—as Karen Drake puts it,
“to pursue truth”—with protection from some kinds of consequences.20
I particularly recognize here James Turk’s functional and purposive
description of academic freedom: “academic freedom is a professional
right—a right necessary to fulfill one’s professional obligations as a
teacher and scholar.”21 Unlike the labour relations context, where the
relevant potential consequences are employment consequences from the
university as employer, in my analysis the relevant potential consequences
are regulatory and disciplinary consequences from lawyer-academics’
governing law societies. While academic freedom in the Canadian context
is generally concerned with the protection from consequences imposed by
the university, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has described it as including protection from “discrimination
or fear of repression by the State or any other actor,” which would include

16. Cass R Sunstein, “Professors and Politics” (1999) 148 U Pa L Rev 191 at 199, online:
<scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol148/iss1/10/> [perma.cc/AVG4-AXDY]. See also
Michael Horn, Academic Freedom in Canada: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999)
(“[p]rofessors have used the concept of academic freedom to justify their right to participate in public
life and express opinions on matters of public interest” at 5).
17. See e.g. McPeak, supra note 9 (“[l]aw professors can share their expertise, promote their
institutions, and engage with scholars, students, media, and the public” at 228 [citations omitted]).
18. See e.g. Alford v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 ONCA 657 (standing), 2022 ONSC 2911
(merits); Elizabeth Payne, “Law professor Amir Attaran files private criminal prosecution against Ford
for removing mask while in quarantine,” Ottawa Citizen (18 May 2022), online: <ottawacitizen.com/
news/local-news/law-professor-files-private-criminal-prosecution-against-ford-for-removing-maskwhile-in-quarantine> [perma.cc/A4Q2-4Q4K].
19. Karen Drake, “Finding a Path to Reconciliation: Mandatory Indigenous Law, Anishnaabe
Pedagogy, and Academic Freedom” (2017) 95:1 Can Bar Rev 9 at 34, online: <cbr.cba.org/index.php/
cbr/article/view/4399> [perma.cc/JPY8-8FRU].
20. Ibid at 34.
21. James Turk, “Introduction”, in Turk, ed, supra note 3, 11 at 11-12. See also e.g. David Barnhizer,
“Freedom to Do What? Institutional Neutrality, Academic Freedom, and Academic Responsibility”
(1993) 43:3 J Legal Educ 346 (under the heading “Academic Freedom as Purposive Responsibility”:
“[a]cademic freedom is not an end in itself; it exists only so that higher ends may be achieved” at 348).
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law societies exercising delegated provincial powers.22 Moreover, whereas
academic freedom as a labour relations protection may not adhere to all
lawyers who engage in teaching and research, I use the scope of academic
freedom as an important point of reference for all lawyer-academics.
Using this meaning and scope of academic freedom, I differentiate
between high-value and low-value research and teaching. By low-value
teaching and research, I mean teaching and research with little pedagogical
or epistemic value, such that it is less likely and less worthy to attract
the protection of academic freedom. Conversely, high-value teaching and
research has more pedagogical or epistemic value, such that it is more
likely and more worthy to attract the protection of academic freedom.
High-value teaching and research, all else equal, is more likely to be
effective teaching and research.
Two important undercurrents inform my analysis. The first is that,
although teaching and research do not constitute the practice of law, and so
law professors are non-practicing when they engage in these activities, law
professors’ teaching and research is better considered “practice-adjacent”
or “quasi-practice” than truly extraprofessional conduct. Legal teaching
and research, in critiquing the state of the law and purporting to identify
what the law is and should be, shares many of the elements of the practice
of law. Indeed, legal scholarship (especially in its role as doctrine in the
Quebec civilian system) is often considered by judges and argued by the
counsel appearing before them. At the same time, I recognize that law
professors are not required to be lawyers. I do not suggest that non-lawyer
legal academics are engaged in the unlicensed and thus unlawful practice
of law. My point is that of the sphere of formally and definitionally extraprofessional conduct, lawyer-academic teaching and research activities
are those closest to the boundary (i.e. those closest to the practice of law).
While there is disagreement in the literature over whether law societies
should regulate extraprofessional conduct,23 it follows that teaching
and research by law professors who are lawyers is the subset of extraprofessional conduct most worthy of law society regulation.24

22. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment 13, UNECOSOC, 21st Sess,
UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) at para 39, online (pdf): <documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G99/462/16/PDF/G9946216.pdf?OpenElement> [perma.cc/TR2E-HB7R] [General Comment
13].
23. See below notes 108-109.
24. As the teaching and research activities of lawyer-academics are extraprofessional conduct, any
discipline for those activities would be for conduct unbecoming as opposed to professional misconduct.
The distinction, however, has little impact in application and thus is not important for my purposes.
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The second undercurrent is that, without purporting to resolve the longstanding debates over the respective roles of law schools and law societies in
preparing future lawyers, at least some law professors should demonstrate
and model acceptable professional conduct—as expected in the legal
profession—to law students. In the Canadian context, David Tanovich
suggests that one reason for what he characterizes as “a professionalism
crisis in law school” is “the failure of law professors, including sessional
faculty, to sometimes serve as appropriate role models.”25 Norman Redlich
makes a similar point about civility specifically.26 Indeed, Robert Kuehn
argues that, as role models for law students, lawyer-academics must have
“greater sensitivity to ethical norms” than practicing lawyers.27 Thus,
to the extent that law society regulation encourages law professors who
are lawyers to model professional conduct to students, that result is not
25.David M Tanovich, “Learning to Act Like a Lawyer: A Model Code of Professional Responsibility
for Law Students” (2009) 27 Windsor YB Access Just 75 at 95, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1816606> [perma.cc/NX2M-E5ZL]. See also Elman, supra note 3 (“[l]aw faculty
members can, and should, be professional role models for their students” at 105).
26. Norman Redlich, “Professional Responsibility of Law Teachers” (1980) 29:4 Clev St L Rev
623, online: <engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol29/iss4/2/> [perma.cc/WKB3-9QGJ]
(“[t]hrough the example of their professors, law students should develop habits of courtesy and
respect for fellow lawyers… In a professional school, which seeks to set standards for the future
conduct of lawyers, there is a particularly heavy responsibility on the part of the faculty to debate
differences openly, civilly and without rancor. This is, after all, what we expect of participants in
the adversary system. We should not expect less of law teachers” at 627). See also Douglas S Lang,
“The Role of Law Professors: A Critical Force in Shaping Integrity and Professionalism” (2001) 42:2
S Tex L Rev 509 (“[i]t is clear that in order to effectively educate law students and prepare them for
practice, law professors must, first and foremost, be lawyers, not just scholars. Since law professors
direct the metamorphosis of a student’s mind from a college student to a law school graduate ready
for the Bar, professors must strive to be an example of the best of everything that it means to be a
lawyer” at 513-514 [emphasis in original]). See also Roger E Schechter, “Changing Law Schools to
Make Less Nasty Lawyers” (1996) 10:2 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 367 at 381-384, esp: (“there may
be a subtle message of incivility inherent in our educational methodology that may condition our
students to be tolerant and accepting of incivility in the workplace after they graduate. The rigor of
the socratic method can all too often slide into a dismissive or sarcastic exchange in which the teacher
communicates an unspoken but nonetheless powerful message that rude or mean-spirited wise cracks,
and even temper tantrums, are entirely appropriate behavior, especially when you can get away with
it… Additionally, some of us [law professors] no doubt criticize the courts, individual judges, and
practitioners as a group in ways that suggest a kind of embryonic incivility” at 381). See also BoothePerry, supra note 4 at 71-72.
27. Kuehn, supra note 4 at 296. See also 297. And see on civility e.g. Jennifer K Robbennolt &
Vikram D Amar, “The Role of Lawyers and Law Schools in Fostering Civil Public Debate” (2021)
52:2 Conn L Rev 1093, online: <opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/451/> [perma.cc/624Z-2F4M]
(“[i]n serving as institutional and cultural custodians, lawyers are required to assume particular roles.
It is for this reason that professional rules of conduct encourage—and successful law schools teach—
lawyers to separate the professional from the personal” at 1099, [citation omitted]). See also at Robert
P Schuwerk, “The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We Owe to Our Students” (2004)
45:4 S Tex L Rev 753 (“[t]eaching virtue is hard…. It is done by having a lawyer living out the rules
of ethics in the actual practice of law before students’ eyes, and then insisting that those students live
them out before hers” at 786).
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problematic and is in fact desirable. Again, I do not argue that all law
professors should be lawyers, but I recognize that there is value in at least
some law professors modelling professionalism to their students, and
law society regulation of lawyer-academics promotes that result. There
is of course nothing stopping non-lawyer professors from modelling
professional conduct if they so choose—but neither are they obliged to
hold themselves out as such models. Indeed, they may embrace their
relative freedom of conduct by explicitly warning their students against
emulating that conduct.
II. Teaching and research and the rules of professional conduct
If the law societies were to regulate the teaching and research of lawyeracademics, what rules would be most applicable? I begin my analysis by
canvassing the elements of the law of lawyering, particularly as expressed
in the rules of professional conduct, that would be most likely to be
engaged by the teaching and research of lawyer-academics: the duty to
encourage respect for the administration of justice, the duty of civility, and
the duty of competence. While I do not argue that law society regulation
and discipline have no impact on the ability of lawyer-academics to fulfill
their roles, I suggest that such an impact is minimal and positive instead
of problematic.
Before moving onto these three duties and related concepts, I
emphasize one way that law society regulation of lawyers, including
lawyer-academics, reinforces academic values. There are many reported
law society decisions in which past academic dishonesty goes to character
and endangers an applicant’s ability to become an articled student or a
lawyer,28 or constitutes grounds for discipline once a lawyer.29 So long as
the law society does not have a broader definition of academic dishonesty
than the university community, there is no clash between academic
freedom and the professional discipline of lawyer-academics for academic
dishonesty.

28. See e.g. Re Applicant 5, 2012 LSBC 24; Nsamba v Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONLSTH
62; Dubey v Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONLSTH 134 at paras 38-42; Olowolafe v Law Society
of Ontario, 2019 ONLSTH 155; Seifi v Law Society of Ontario, 2019 ONLSTH 56; Law Society of
Saskatchewan v Bachynski, 2013 SKLSS 2; Law Society of Saskatchewan v Frost-Hinz, 2012 SKLSS
7.
29. See e.g. Law Society of Upper Canada v Shane Smith, 2008 ONLSHP 65; Law Society of Ontario
v Ranjan, 2019 ONLSTH 90.
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1. The duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice—and
to improve it
The most readily apparent professional duty affecting lawyer-academics is
the duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice.
The rule itself is brief: “A lawyer must encourage public respect for
and try to improve the administration of justice.”30 The commentaries to
the rule, however, demonstrate that the duty is a nuanced and complex
one. Far from prohibiting “scrutiny and criticism,” the commentary
instead prohibits only “criticism that is petty, intemperate or unsupported
by a bona fide belief in its real merit” and “irresponsible allegations.”31
Moreover, the duty may indeed require criticism: “a lawyer should not
hesitate to speak out against an injustice.”32
I emphasize here that, while the heading to the rule merely identifies
one duty—“encouraging respect for the administration of justice”—the
rule itself contains a two-fold duty: not just to encourage respect for
the administration of justice, but also to improve it.33 The commentaries
confirm that the duty to encourage respect is itself double-headed, at
least with respect to judges: lawyers are called on to criticize them when
that criticism is legitimate but also to defend them against illegitimate
criticism.34
Given the impact and role of the case-law method, teaching law in
common-law Canada necessarily involves critiquing and criticizing the
decisions of judges and their reasons: their strengths and weaknesses, or
even outright legal errors; the relative merits of concurrences and dissents;
the incompatibility of different strands of case law; and the positive or
negative implications of a decision for the law as a whole. Part of this
process may involve critiquing the submissions of counsel, particularly
in classes on advocacy, or the legal opinions on which parties rely, where
those opinions are made public. Judges, and sometimes counsel, are often
referred to by name.

30. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: FLSC,
2009, as amended October 19, 2019), r 5.6-1, online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada <flsc.
ca/resources/> [perma.cc/5BC7-RG7W] [FLSC Model Code]. In Quebec, see Code of Professional
Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR c B-1, r 3.1, ss 12, 111 [Quebec Code].
31. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 5.6-1, commentary 3.1.
32. Ibid, r 5.6-1, commentary 1.
33. See also Stewart v Canadian Broadcasting Corp (1997), 150 DLR (4th) 24 at 116 (Ont Ct J (Gen
Div)) (“[r]ule 11 contains two separate directions. The lawyer should encourage public respect for the
administration of justice. In addition, the lawyer should try to improve the administration of justice” at
116). With respect, the two duties are sometimes difficult to disentangle. In the US context see Kuehn,
supra note 4 at 284-286.
34. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 5.6-1, commentary 1.
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Of course, litigators do essentially the same thing publicly in the
normal course of practice—indeed, virtually every appeal involves
assertions and arguments of legal or factual error. Many lawyers also do
so privately, and sometimes publicly, when informing or advising clients
or potential clients about the state of the law. They are, however, bound by
the rules of professional conduct to do so properly.
Insofar as legal teaching and research is practice-adjacent, similar
norms would seem to apply. Even if I am wrong that teaching and research
is practice-adjacent, the commentaries to the rule emphasize that the
duty applies to any statements, professional or extraprofessional: “The
obligation outlined in the rule is not restricted to the lawyer’s professional
activities but is a general responsibility resulting from the lawyer’s
position in the community. A lawyer’s responsibilities are greater than
those of a private citizen.”35 The Quebec rules go further: “When a lawyer
engages in activities which do not relate to the profession of lawyer, in
particular in connection with a job, a function, an office or the operation of
an enterprise…he must ensure that those activities do not compromise his
compliance with this code.”36
Teaching and research in legal ethics and judicial ethics is particularly
perilous in light of this rule. In those fields, the conduct and not the reasoning
of judges and lawyers—often specific named judges and lawyers—is at
issue.37 At the same time, professional responsibility counsel, law society
35. Ibid. See also Law Society of Alberta v Rauf, 2021 ABLS 3 at para 113 [Rauf], aff’g 2018 ABLS
13: This duty “is not restricted to a lawyer’s professional practice.”
36. Quebec Code, supra note 30, s 11(1).
37. See e.g. John Mark Keyes, “Loyalty, Legality and Public Sector Lawyers” (2019) 97:1 Can
Bar Rev 129 (on lawyer Edgar Schmidt) online: <cbr.cba.org/index.php/cbr/article/view/4510>
[perma.cc/EB7R-XYWV]; Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Folk Hero or Legal Pariah? A Comment on
the Legal Ethics of Edgar Schmidt and Schmidt v Canada (Attorney General)” (2021) 43:2 Man LJ
198 online: <www.canlii.org/en/commentary/journals/16/3271/> [perma.cc/BQ6C-E4WS]; Andrew
Flavelle Martin, “The Government Lawyer as Activist: A Legal Ethics Analysis” (2020) 41 Windsor
Review of Legal & Social Issues 28 online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3625992>
[perma.cc/W2MQ-PC44] (on lawyers David Lepofsky and Michael Leshner); Brent Cotter, “The
Prime Minister v the Chief Justice of Canada: The Attorney General’s Failure of Responsibility”
(2015) 18:1 Leg Ethics 73 (on federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General Peter MacKay); Alice
Woolley, “The Resignation of Ronald Camp: Background and Reflections from Canada” (2017) 20:1
Legal Ethics 134; Micah Rankin, “Gerry Laarakker: From Rustic Rambo to Rebel with a Cause”
in Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer: Stories from the Canadian
Legal Profession (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) 225; Allan C Hutchinson, “Putting Up a Defence:
Sex, Murder, and Videotapes” in Dodek & Woolley 40 (on lawyer Ken Murray); Elaine Craig, “The
Ethical Obligations of Defence Counsel in Sexual Assault Cases” (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall LJ 427
online: <digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol51/iss2/2/> [perma.cc/72GG-LAV3]; Elaine
Craig, “Examining the Websites of Canada’s “Top Sex Crime Lawyers”: The Ethical Parameters of
Online Commercial Expression by the Criminal Defence Bar” (2015) 48:2 UBC L Rev 257 online:
<digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/scholarly_works/43/> [perma.cc/76A6-5T5E]; Elaine Craig,
Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal Profession (Montreal: McGill-
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panels and tribunals, and bodies such as the Canadian Judicial Council
routinely evaluate these matters in the course of their functions.
I acknowledge, but reject, the concern that an enforceable commitment
to encourage respect for and improve the administration of justice is
itself inherently contrary to academic freedom.38 For example, Howard
Woodhouse, though not writing in the context of law schools, asserts that
“[a]cademic freedom enables faculty and students to espouse views and
articulate theories that differ from those dominant in their discipline, their
university, and/or their society. Dissenting views can flourish because they
are protected.”39 However, the duties of lawyers, particularly the duty to
encourage respect for and to improve the administration of justice, are not
analogous to a dissenting view. Teaching and research in accordance with
professional responsibilities are not, for example, the secular equivalent
of teaching and research from an enforced religious perspective. Elaine
Craig has persuasively argued that “it is antithetical to the development
of the skill of critical thinking about ethical issues in law to require that it
be taught from one particular, and purported to be singularly authoritative,
perspective.”40 Her analysis focused, however, on a particular kind
of religious perspective, i.e. “the perspective that the Bible is the sole,
ultimate, and authoritative source of truth for all ethical decision making.”41
The key difference between an internally-enforced religious perspective
and an externally-enforced compliance with lawyers’ professional duties
is that lawyer-academics remain free, and perhaps even obliged where
appropriate, to argue that the law—including but not limited to legal ethics
and the law of lawyering—is wrong and should change. As David Rabban
puts it, “[t]he obligation of law professors to teach professional concepts
and skills…should not affect their academic freedom to express doubt
about the intellectual coherence or social value of what they teach.”42

Queen’s University Press, 2018).
38. Byrne, supra note 4 at 329, frames this question as follows: “Does the attribution to law
professors of professional obligations breach a bar on political neutrality by imposing an ideological
context on legal academics?”
39. Howard Woodhouse, “Academic Freedom and Collegial Governance Under Threat at A Canadian
University” (2019) 50 Interchange 113 at 114.
40. Elaine Craig, “The Case for the Federation of Law Societies Rejecting Trinity Western
University’s Proposed Law Degree Program” (2013) 25:1 CJWL 148 at 165, online: <digitalcommons.
schulichlaw.dal.ca/scholarly_works/52/> [perma.cc/69K3-45NN].
41. Ibid at 169.
42. David M Rabban, “Does Professional Education Constrain Academic Freedom?” (1993) 43:3
J Legal Educ 358 at 360. See also Lang, supra note 26 (“[n]o one expects professors to abandon the
intellectual analysis of the Creed” at 517).
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Indeed, Peter Byrne asserts that a commitment to competence, ethics,
and the improvement of the administration of justice are definitional
features of a law school, not barriers to academic freedom:
a law school does necessarily embody some vague ideological
commitments that may be binding on its faculty. Law schools surely
affirm that the legal profession and the institutions it dominates ought
to serve ‘the public interest,’ that existing laws should be improved, and
that individual lawyers ought to be competent and ethical.43

For example, Horace Read argues that “[t]he responsibility of the academic
[law] teacher in the administration of justice is the most obvious of his
public responsibilities.”44 The lawyer’s duty to improve the administration
of justice arguably dovetails with the professor’s responsibility to engage
in and improve society.45
I acknowledge here that legal academics in traditions such as critical
legal studies may argue that the Canadian justice system is irredeemably
racist and oppressive.46 However, such criticism if thoughtful and
supported should not violate this duty. While I acknowledge that a hearing
panel of the Law Society of Manitoba recently held that a lawyer violated
this duty when he “equated the governance of Canadians and Manitobans
with capricious fascist dictatorship as opposed to the Rule of Law” and
repeatedly invoked comparisons to Hitler, that was far from a thoughtful
and supported analysis—and was questioned on appeal.47
The duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice,
properly understood, does not meaningfully constrain academic freedom in
that it constrains only low-value teaching and research. Petty or dishonest
criticism has low if any academic value. Indeed, as Michael Horn notes,
“[l]egitimate restrictions on academic freedom do exist…[i]t does not
justify defamation.”48 What about intemperate criticism? That brings me
to civility.

43. Byrne, supra note 4 at 330. See also Ashford, supra note 4 at 144, who asserts that law teachers
have a duty but is vague as to whether that duty is a professional duty of lawyers.
44. Horace E Read, “The Public Responsibilities of the Academic Law Teacher in Canada” (1961)
39:2 Can Bar Rev 232 at 232 online: <cbr.cba.org/index.php/cbr/article/view/2391/2391> [perma.
cc/5Z3A-HVA3].
45. See e.g. Sunstein, supra note 16 (“it is perfectly responsible, maybe even a civic duty, for law
professors to participate in public affairs” at 200).
46. Thanks to Colin Jackson for raising this important point.
47. The Law Society of Manitoba v Brian Attwood Langford, 2020 MBLS 5, aff’d on other grounds
2021 MBCA 87 at paras 14-15.
48. Horn, supra note 16 at 6.
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2. The duty of civility
The meaning and value of civility in the practice of law is contested,49
all the more so after the affirmation by Moldaver J of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada that “trials are not—
nor are they meant to be—tea parties.”50 Nonetheless, Moldaver J did
not explicitly question previous admonitions. For example, Abella J for
the Supreme Court of Canada in Doré v Barreau du Québec invoked
“transcendent civility” and admonished lawyers to speak freely but “to do
so with dignified restraint.”51 Similarly, Steel JA in Histed v Law Society
of Manitoba held that “[w]hile litigants and other interested persons may
comment publicly on cases before the courts and may criticize judicial
decisions in terms which some might consider offensive, lawyers are
bound by the constraints of the professional standards which apply to all
members of the legal profession.”52
Does civility, including the prohibition on intemperate criticism of the
justice system, impede teaching and research with a chilling effect akin to
its purported effect on litigators? Put another way, does intemperateness
have or add pedagogical or epistemological value beyond mere
entertainment or edutainment? John Morgan, the mayor facing law society
disciplinary proceedings for publicly alleging pervasive political bias in
the province’s judiciary, unsuccessfully asserted that to be an effective
politician, “I need to be able to speak colourfully. I need to be able to
speak emotionally… I need, at times, to be able to offend people.”53 Even
if Morgan was correct in his explicit claim that a politician needs to be
able to offend people in order to be effective, it is not obvious that lawyeracademics require an equivalent ability to be effective in their teaching and
49. See FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, (“[a] lawyer must be courteous and civil and act in good
faith to the tribunal and all persons with whom the lawyer has dealings” at r 5.1-5). See also Quebec
Code, supra note 30 (“[a] lawyer must act with honour, dignity, integrity, respect, moderation and
courtesy” at s 4). But see e.g. Alice Woolley, “Does Civility Matter?” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall
LJ 175 online: <digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol46/iss1/6/> [perma.cc/Y42M-R9TH]
(now Woolley J, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench); Alice Woolley, “‘Uncivil by Too Much Civility?’
Critiquing Five More Years of Civility Regulation in Canada” (2013) 36:1 Dal LJ 239, online:
<digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj/vol36/iss1/9/> [perma.cc/78AB-T9HF]. Contra Michael
Code, “Counsel’s Duty of Civility: An Essential Component of Fair Trials and an Effective Justice
System” (2007) 11 Can Crim L Rev 97 (now Code J, Ontario Superior Court of Justice). But see also
Amy Salyzyn, “John Rambo v Atticus Finch: Gender, Diversity and the Civility Movement” (2013)
16:1 Leg Ethics 97, DOI: <10.5235/1460728X.1.1.97>.
50. 2018 SCC 27 at para 3, Moldaver J for the majority [Groia].
51. 2012 SCC 12 [Doré].
52. 2007 MBCA 150 at para 79 [Histed], leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2008] SCCA No 67,
32478 (24 April 2008).
53. Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society v Morgan, 2010 NSBS 1 [Morgan], discussed e.g. in Martin,
“Limits,” supra note 6 at 170-171.
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research roles. Just as Michael Code has argued that incivility interferes
with the ability of counsel and judges to fulfill their roles adequately and
effectively,54 incivility appears to distract from the learning process and
from communicating and demonstrating the merits of academic research.
For example, Redlich asserts in the context of teaching that “[i]t is possible
to be demanding and intellectually rigorous without being demeaning.”55
Similarly, Jennifer Robbennolt and Vikram Amar assert that “[v]igorous
debate, dissent, and zealous advocacy are all valued—and can all be done
in a professional manner.”56 At the same time, if litigation is—for better or
worse—unquestionably not a tea party, presumably teaching and research
are not tea parties either, especially if I am correct that they are practiceadjacent.
Civility is likewise contested in the context of the university, although
I do not assume the scope and meaning of the concept is the same in the
academy as in the legal profession. Jamie Cameron, for example, while
recognizing the intuition that “civility and respect are the hallmarks of
effective and rational debate”57 and acknowledging that “[r]udeness in most
instances is counter-productive,”58 argues that any enforcement of civility
compromises academic freedom.59 In particular, Cameron asserts a chilling
effect and a “risk…that a focus on incivility will deflect attention from
content and sideline messages that might be critically important.”60 With
respect to Cameron, this chilling effect seems abstract and unconvincing
in the absence of more concrete evidence and claims.
In contrast to Cameron, adjudicators and some commentators argue
that civility is consistent with academic freedom. Horn, for example,
argues that “civility, which is sometimes seen as an unacceptable limit
on academic freedom, may in fact be one of its necessary conditions. The
‘heckler’s veto,’…is a negation of academic freedom, not an exercise
of it.”61 Likewise, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights observed in its 1999 General Comment 13 that
“[t]he enjoyment of academic freedom carries with it obligations, such
54. Code, supra note 49 (writing prejudicially).
55. Redlich, supra note 26 at 627.
56. Robbennolt & Amar, supra note 27 at 1099.
57. Jamie Cameron, “Giving and Taking Offence: Civility, Respect, and Academic Freedom” in
Turk, ed, supra note 3, 287 at 292.
58. Ibid at 303.
59. Ibid at 292.
60. Ibid at 294.
61. Horn, supra note 16 at 6. See also Thompson, supra note 3 (“[t]his does not mean that there are
no limits to academic freedom. One is implied: members of the academic staff do not have the right to
limit the academic freedom of other members of the academic staff” at 8). See also below note 82.
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as the duty to respect the academic freedom of others, to ensure the fair
discussion of contrary views, and to treat all without discrimination on
any of the prohibited grounds.”62 Counsel for the faculty association
in University of Waterloo and Faculty Association of the University of
Waterloo acknowledged “that there are limits on academic freedom
based on ethical standards, and a Professor is not protected if he or she
engages in such things as racist comment, harassment, or illegal or unfair
action.”63 Charles Gillin argues, following Re University of Manitoba,64
that “the right to speak publicly on a relevant issue is counterbalanced by
the responsibility to speak with reasonable discretion” and that “academic
freedom does not protect against what administrators might consider
unreasonable breaches of social etiquette…[a]t least in some circumstances
etiquette trumps academic freedom.”65 (Gillin explicitly acknowledges
that Re University of Manitoba is problematic in that “the [arbitrator’s]
emphasis on etiquette confounds the underlying purpose of academic
freedom to protect unwanted, knowledgeable speech.”66) Similarly,
shortly after Re University of Manitoba, the arbitration board in Mount
Allison University Faculty Association and Mount Allison University
noted that “[w]e have some reservation about whether the right to criticize
the Employer can reasonably be extended to cover personal attacks on the
President and other senior members of the administration.”67 Likewise,
Forcese recognizes that “there is a prudential limit to academic freedom
and speech,” which from case law involves “accura[cy],” “appropriate
restraint,” and “respect for the opinions of others.”68 He specifically notes
that academic freedom protects speech “if done honestly, in service of the
academic enterprise, and not simply to offend gratuitously, say in pursuit
of a personal vendetta.”69 (While I recognize that not all civility breaches
are gratuitous, their epistemic and pedagogical value remains unclear and

62. General Comment 13, supra note 22 at para 39.
63. 2001 CanLII 61020 (ONLA). See also Forcese, “Expressive University,” supra note 15 at 42-43
on violence and hate speech.
64. Re University of Manitoba and University of Manitoba Faculty Assn (1991), 21 CLAS 438,
[1991 MGAD No 19 (MBLA).
65. Charles T Gillin, “The Bog-Like Ground on which We Tread: Arbitrating Academic Freedom in
Canada” (2002) 39:3 Can Rev Sociology 301 at 309, 310 DOI: <10.1111/j.1755-618X.2002.tb00622.
x>. (See also “[f]aculty members have the right to speak publicly, but latent rules of etiquette may take
priority,” 315-316).
66. Gillin, supra note 65 at 317.
67. 1994 CanLII 18326 (NB LA).
68. Forcese, “Expressive University,” supra note 15 at 40, quoting Assoc des professeurs de
l’Université Concordia c Université Concordia (grief de Petkov), 2014 LNSARTQ 42 at para 232
69. Forcese, “Expressive University,” supra note 15 at 43 [emphasis added].
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contested.) More generally, Turk notes that “as a professional right, it
[academic freedom] has professional constraints.”70
While this disagreement over civility for academics remains
unresolved, on balance the purported chilling impact of civility on legal
teaching and research does not seem damaging enough to relieve lawyeracademics from their professional obligations of civility. All else equal,
civil teaching and research will be high-value teaching and research, and
vice versa.
3. The duty of competence
A third relevant rule is competence.71 Competence is potentially at issue
when lawyer-academics in their teaching or research purport to give a
doctrinal statement as to what the law is or to characterize a particular
judge, counsel, or academic as incorrect in a statement of law. Just as
with negligence, however,72 a single error does not mean a lawyer is
incompetent.
It is not clear that the lawyer’s professional duty of competence,
properly understood as being short of “perfection,” would impair academic
freedom in a meaningful way.73 Indeed, while Cory J for the majority in
Dickason v University of Alberta found that “there are serious difficulties
inherent in any attempt to measure the competence and productivity of
professors,”74 and while the meaning of competence in an academic setting
may differ from that of lawyers, the ability to mis-state the law—or at least
the ability to repeatedly and frequently mis-state the law—in research or
teaching appears antithetical to the pursuit of truth. Justice La Forest of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Mckinney v University of Guelph recognized
that “incompetence” is one of the few valid grounds for termination of even
a tenured professor.75 Similarly, in the US context, Robert Post explains that
“unlike the First Amendment, however, academic freedom of research also
limits dissent, for it requires that dissent be cognizable as an exercise of
disciplinary competence.”76
While it is not necessarily true that the concept of incompetence is
the same for academics as for lawyers, and indeed incompetence is not
70. Turk, supra note 21 at 12, quoted in Forcese, “Expressive University,” supra note 15 at 42.
71. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 3.1-2. See also Quebec Code, supra note 30, ss 20-21.
72. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 3.1-2, commentary 15.
73. Ibid, r 3.1-2, commentary 15.
74. Dickason v University of Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1992] 2 SCR 1103 at 1137, 95
DLR (4th) 439.
75. [1990] 3 SCR 229 at 283, 76 DLR (4th) 545.
76. Robert C Post, “Academic Freedom and Legal Scholarship” (2015) 64:4 J Legal Educ 530 at 535
online: <jle.aals.org/home/vol64/iss4/11/> [perma.cc/EW98-JE6M] [emphasis in original].
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well-defined in the case law on academic freedom, a law professor who
routinely misstated the law to an extent that violated their professional duty
of competence would presumably be considered incompetent as a teacher
and researcher. On the other hand, Sidney Hook argues that academic
freedom includes “the right to heresy in the field of his competence…
[t]he right in good faith to be wrong.”77 As Drake puts it, citing Hook: “If
truth is to be identified, those who search for it cannot be constrained by
prescribed dogma. They must be permitted to conduct their search without
fear of reprisal in case it turns out that the truth is unpopular.”78
Lawyers, including lawyer-academics, can legitimately disagree
over anything from the statement of the holding in a particular case or
the interpretation of a statutory provision, to doctrinal statements of the
law broadly. However, it does not follow that some statements of the law
cannot be objectively wrong. Again, all else equal, teaching and research
that reflects the lawyer’s professional duty of competence will be highvalue teaching and research.
Following Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, the professional
duty of competence is also more specifically relevant to academics who
teach and research in legal ethics. Recall that Moldaver J for the majority
in Groia held that erroneous allegations of misconduct against opposing
counsel are a matter of competence, not civility.79 Presumably, erroneous
allegations of misconduct against any lawyer or judge are similarly a matter
of competence. That, however, brings me to what I term the Laarakker
problem.
4. The Laarakker problem for legal ethics teaching and research
The appropriate role for lawyer-academics to critique the behaviour of
lawyers, and presumably judges, depends on how one reads the reasons
of the Hearing Panel of the Law Society of British Columbia in Re
Laarakker.80 Laarakker was the lawyer perturbed by his client’s receipt of
a demand letter asserting a legally hollow claim for damages purportedly
incurred because of shoplifting by the client’s teenage child.81 Laarakker
sent an intemperate fax to the lawyer who signed the letter and made
intemperate blog posts about the lawyer.82 The panel held that this incivility

77. Sidney Hook, “The Principles and Problems of Academic Freedom” (1986) 58:1 Contemp Educ
6 at 7.
78. Drake, supra note 19 at 39, citing Hook, supra note 77 at 7.
79. Groia, supra note 50 at para 96.
80. 2011 LSBC 29, penalty at 2012 LSBC 2.
81. Ibid at paras 8-11.
82. Ibid at paras 12-14.
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constituted professional misconduct.83 Read generally, Re Laarakker holds
that another lawyer’s unprofessional conduct does not justify incivility in
response. That interpretation poses no problems for legal ethics teaching
and research. But a closer reading suggests that where a lawyer determines
that another lawyer has violated their professional obligations, the correct
course of action is a complaint to that lawyer’s law society and not public
criticism of that lawyer’s conduct:
Even if the Ontario Lawyer [the author of the demand letter] can be
considered to be a “rogue,” it is not the Respondent’s place to pursue
some form of vigilante justice against that lawyer by posting intemperate
personal remarks or by writing letters that do not promote any possibility
of resolution of the client’s legal dispute…. Clearly, the appropriate
avenue for the Respondent to take would have been to file a complaint
either with the Law Society of Upper Canada or the Law Society of
British Columbia.84

Thus, it is unclear whether the core problem was Laarakker’s incivility,
the public nature of that incivility, the public criticism of another lawyer’s
conduct, or some combination of the three. Teaching and research are
presumably not “vigilante justice,”85 though Re Laarakker sets a low
bar. A prohibition on all public criticism of another lawyer, at least so
long as that public criticism is civil, would certainly impede academic
freedom and is inconsistent with the lawyer’s ability to criticize judges
and the administration of justice itself.86 Thus, the rules prohibit only “illconsidered or uninformed criticism of the competence, conduct, advice
or charges of other lawyers,” not merely any criticism.87 Nonetheless,
Re Laarakker suggests that a lawyer-academic who intends to criticize
a lawyer’s conduct should first make a complaint with the corresponding
law society. A corresponding requirement would presumably apply to
83. Ibid at para 48.
84. Ibid at paras 45-46.
85. Ibid at para 45.
86. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 5.6-1. See above notes 8-9 and corresponding text.
87. Ibid, r 7.2-1, commentary 3. See also Quebec Code, supra note 30 (“[a] lawyer must collaborate
with other lawyers in the interests of clients and the sound administration of justice. He must therefore
avoid any unfair practice or any conduct towards another lawyer which could abuse the other lawyer’s
good faith or trust. He must also avoid criticizing, in an unrestrained or unfounded manner, his
competence or conduct, the quality of his services or his fees” at ss 132, [emphasis added]). See
also The Advocates’ Society, Principles of Civility and Professionalism for Advocates (Toronto: The
Society, 2020) online: <www.advocates.ca> [perma.cc/8FCH-8FZL] (“[a]dvocates should not make
ill-considered, gratuitous, derogatory, or uninformed comments about opposing counsel to others,
including clients and the court” at s 42. The Principles also focus on the forum in which criticism
is made, providing that “reasoned criticism based on evidence of lack of competence, unacceptable
or discriminatory conduct, or unprofessional acts may be made in the appropriate forum” (s 42,
[emphasis added]) but that social media is not such a forum (s 43)).

Law Society Regulation and the Lawyer Academic

535

academics criticizing the conduct of a judge. However, such a broad
reading of a single disciplinary decision would both strangle legal ethics
teaching and research and misdirect the resources of law societies.
5. Conclusion
In this Part, I have canvassed how the law of lawyering, and particularly
the rules of professional conduct, potentially engage the teaching and
research of lawyer-academics. I have suggested that the potential effects
on academic freedom are relatively minor at most. That is, the prospect
of regulation and even discipline by law societies does not unduly negate
the ability of lawyer-academics to fulfill their roles in the university. Law
society regulation would constrain only low-value teaching and research;
indeed, all else equal, teaching and research that complies with the rules
of professional conduct will be high-value teaching and research. Now I
turn to the legal question of whether law societies can regulate lawyeracademics.
III. The can question: can law societies regulate lawyer-academics?
Given that teaching and research by lawyer-academics engages at least
some of the law of lawyering and the rules of professional conduct, in this
part I consider whether law societies can indeed regulate the teaching and
research of lawyer-academics as a matter of law.
1. Constitutional considerations
The starting point for my analysis in this Part is that despite the importance
of academic freedom, the concept has yet to be constitutionalized or
meaningfully codified in Canada88—although Canadian legislation
and the Charter should be interpreted in accordance with Canada’s
obligations under international law, which have been interpreted to protect
academic freedom.89 While I flag the intriguing possibility that freedom
of association could constitutionalize protections for academic freedoms
insofar as such protections are the result of collective bargaining, I leave
that argument for other scholars and another day. I also observe that, at
88. Contrast e.g. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ Europ Comm C
364/01, Art 13: “The arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be
respected.”
89. See e.g. Schreiber v Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 62 at para 50; General Comment 13,
supra note 22 at para 39 [emphasis added], interpreting Article 13 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1996) 993 UNTS 3: “Members of the academic community,
individually or collectively, are free to pursue, develop and transmit knowledge and ideas, through
research, teaching, study, discussion, documentation, production, creation or writing. Academic
freedom includes the liberty of individuals to express freely opinions about the institution or system in
which they work, to fulfil their functions without discrimination or fear of repression by the State or
any other actor.” Thanks to Sara Seck for encouraging me to consider this important point.
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least in Canadian law, academic freedom is not codified in statute in such
a way that those provisions might be interpreted as overriding legislation
on the legal profession. Thus, at least for the moment and for the purposes
of this article, academic freedom in itself does not have the constitutional
or sub-constitutional force to oust law society jurisdiction over lawyeracademics.90
Instead, the strongest potential protection for the teaching and research
of lawyer-academics comes from freedom of expression under section 2(b)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,91 though that protection
may be more nuanced than it first appears. It is certainly clear that the
Charter applies to law societies and their rules of professional conduct.92
It is equally clear, however, that lawyers accept limits on their Charter
rights—in particular, freedom of expression—that the general public does
not.93 Put another way, infringements of lawyers’ section 2(b) rights will be
more readily justifiable under section 1 of the Charter than infringements
of the section 2(b) rights of non-lawyers—or, in the administrative law
context, a decision that the obligations of lawyers outweigh their Charter
rights to freedom of expression will generally be reasonable.94
However, most of these precedents are potentially distinguishable
because they consider practicing lawyers. The only exception is Nova
Scotia Barristers’ Society v Morgan, in which the panel held that law
societies’ constraints on even non-practicing lawyers are justifiable
infringements of section 2(b) under section 1 of the Charter.95 I have
elsewhere questioned this holding in Morgan by suggesting that nonpracticing lawyers may have stronger section 2(b) claims than practicing
lawyers.96 That suggestion, however, is at least partially rooted in a
conception of political speech as “core” expression for the purposes of

90. See Forcese, “Expressive University,” supra note 14 (“[i]f academic freedom has no basis in
legislation, a legal breach of academic freedom can only stem from a contract, or some other common
law principle” at 30-31, [citation omitted]. But see also 28, suggesting that academic freedom may
provide a basis for common-law privilege under the law of evidence and 29, quoting from McKenzie v
Isla, 2012 HRTO 1908 at para 35 on the reluctance of human rights tribunals to intervene in university
speech contexts).
91. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 2(b) [Charter]. In the US context see Kuehn, supra note
4 at 267-269.
92. See e.g. Doré, supra note 51 at paras 2-6; Histed, supra note 52 at paras 57, 93; Re Klein and
Law Society of Upper Canada (1985), 50 OR (2d) 118, 16 DLR (4th) 489 (Div Ct).
93. See e.g. Histed, supra note 52 at para 79; Doré, supra note 51 at para 68.
94. See again e.g. Histed, supra note 52 at para 79; Doré, supra note 51 at para 68.
95. Morgan, supra note 16 (discussed e.g. in Martin, “Limits,” supra note 6 at 171).
96. Martin, “Limits,” supra note 6 at 169, 171.
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section 2(b) of the Charter and thus would be more applicable to lawyerpoliticians and political commentators than to lawyer-academics.
The viability of a parallel protection for lawyer-academics would
depend in part on whether academic speech—teaching and research—is
properly considered “core” expression or otherwise analogous to political
speech. While not using “core” characterizations, Canadian courts have
indeed recognized the value of university research and teaching. That
value may protect academic speech in a similar way as political speech.
For example, La Forest J in Mckinney stated that “[a]cademic freedom
and excellence is essential to our continuance as a lively democracy”97—
though, as Dwight Newman notes, “he gives it no specific legal force.”98
Similarly, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario has held
that
academic freedom is of vital importance to our society. It permits the
free flow of information and academic opinion and encourages critical
debate and the engagement of this country’s best minds in causes, issues,
and policies; even when such debate and criticism may be politically
unpopular. Academic freedom protects our free and democratic society
by allowing our scholars and academics to investigate controversial
issues and unpopular views, without interference or scrutiny by the
government or the public.99

(I acknowledge that the Commissioner here seems to be referring at least
in part to the institutional-autonomy component of academic freedom.)
Like political speech, these characterizations emphasize that freedom
of expression protects and benefits not only the speaker but the listener
and society at large—indeed, this very concept was first recognized in
cases about the freedom of the press to report on the courts.100 In a free
and democratic society, criticism of the justice system and its participants
must likewise be “core” expression and is not meaningfully distinct or
even distinguishable from political expression. Nonetheless, if practicing
lawyers within that system can legitimately be constrained, it is difficult
to see how lawyer-academics would receive greater protection for their
expression.

97. McKinney, supra note 75 at 286-287, as quoted e.g. in Dwight G Newman, “Application of the
Charter to Universities’ Limitation of Expression” (2015) 45:1-2 RDUS 133 at 149.
98. Newman, supra note 97 at 149.
99. Re University of Ottawa, Order PO-3084 at para 29, 2012 CanLII 31568 (ON IPC).
100. Edmonton Journal v Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at 1339, 64 DLR (4th) 577,
quoting Ford v Quebec (Attorney General) [1988] 2 SCR 712 at 767, 54 DLR (4th) 577.
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It might seem ironic that Mckinney, like much of the Canadian legal
literature on academic freedom and universities,101 focuses on whether
academic freedom may preclude the application of the Charter to and
within universities, yet I am suggesting that the Charter should protect
academic speech. However, Paperny JA in Pridgen v University of Calgary
noted that “there is no legitimate conceptual conflict between academic
freedom and freedom of expression. Academic freedom and the guarantee
of freedom of expression contained in the Charter are handmaidens to the
same goals; the meaningful exchange of ideas, the promotion of learning,
and the pursuit of knowledge.”102 Contrast in the US context Post, who
emphasizes collegial evaluation and judgement of academic research:
“Academic freedom of research is … nothing at all like a First Amendment
right to say what one pleases without fear of legal repercussions … Unlike
the First Amendment, however, academic freedom of research also limits
dissent.”103
Thus, it seems unlikely that law society discipline of lawyer-academics
for their teaching or research constitutes an unjustifiable infringement of
freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter. I proceed with my
analysis on the basis that, as a question of law, law societies can regulate
and discipline lawyer-academics in their teaching and research.
2. Interference with academic discipline
The ability of universities to discipline lawyer-academics in their capacity
as academics does not preclude law society discipline of lawyer-academics
in their capacity as lawyers. This reality is a clear parallel to Krieger v Law
Society of Alberta, in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
potential for a Crown Attorney to face employment consequences for their
conduct did not preclude law society discipline.104
3. On balance: yes they can
While there remains some doctrinal uncertainty given the absence of any
direct precedent, I conclude that law societies can—as a matter of law—
101. Craig Jones, “Immunizing Universities from Charter Review: Are We ‘Contracting Out’
Censorship” (2003) 52 UNB LJ 261; Krupa M Kotecha, “Charter Application in the University
Context: An Inquiry of Necessity” (2016) 26:1 Educ & LJ 21; Michael Marin, “Should the Charter
Apply to Universities” (2015) 35:1 National J Constitutional L 29; Newman, supra note 97; Franco
Silletta, “Revisiting Charter Application to Universities” (2015) 20 Appeal 79 online: <journals.
uvic.ca/index.php/appeal/article/view/13596> [perma.cc/C693-NELK]; Kenneth Wm Thornicroft,
“Rethinking McKinney: To What Extent Should Universities Be Charter-Free Zones?” (2020) 29:1
Educ & LJ 79; Forcese, “Expressive University,” supra note 14 at 19-25.
102. 2012 ABCA 139 at para 117, quoted e.g. in Newman, supra note 97 at 152.
103. Post, supra note 76 at 533, 535 [emphasis in original].
104. 2002 SCC 65 at para 50 [Krieger].
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discipline lawyer-academics for their teaching and research. Far from
ending the analysis, this conclusion points to the next question: should
law societies exercise this legal power?
IV. The should question: should law societies regulate lawyeracademics?
Even if I am correct that law societies can regulate lawyer-academics
in their research and teaching, whether they should do so is a separate
question.
I argue that law societies should regulate teaching and research by
lawyer-academics for two reasons. First, such regulation is necessary for
law societies to fulfill their mandate to regulate the profession in the public
interest. Second, any negative effects on teaching and research are minimal
or outweighed by positive effects, or both. However, such a policy decision
should be left to the law societies—any legislative imposition would
impair the independence of the bar.105 Thus my goal here is to persuade
law societies to regulate lawyer-academics, not to persuade legislators to
require law societies to regulate lawyer-academics.
I also emphasize that, based on my analysis in Parts II and III, there
is no compelling reason to regulate lawyer-academics any differently than
other non-practicing lawyers, be they lawyer-politicians such as John
Morgan or lawyer-pundits such as Ezra Levant.
1. Law society regulation of lawyer-academics is necessary and
appropriate to fulfilling the role of law societies
The mandate of law societies is to regulate the legal profession in the
public interest.106 Failures of lawyer-academics to meet their duties of
competence, civility, and to encourage respect for the administration of
justice are legitimate and necessary subjects of law society regulation.
Law societies have a legitimate regulatory interest in the ability of
lawyer-academics to return to practice in the future. Perhaps the ability and
willingness to comply with the duty of civility and the duty to encourage
respect for the administration of justice can easily and deliberately be
turned on and off, such that present incivility and failure to encourage
respect for the administration of justice is not necessarily predictive of
future incivility and failure to encourage respect for the administration
of justice. However, the ability and willingness to comply with the
105. While Cromwell J for the majority in Canada (Attorney General) v Federation of Law Societies
of Canada, 2015 SCC 7 at para 80 declined to determine whether this principle constitutes a principle
of fundamental justice, the court below had done so: 2013 BCCA 147 at paras 105-115.
106. See e.g. Law Society of New Brunswick v Ryan, 2003 SCC 20 at para 36; Merchant v Law Society
(Saskatchewan), 2002 SKCA 60 at para 57.
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duty of competence cannot be turned on and off in the same way. The
duty of competence is different: present incompetence is predictive of
future incompetence. The law society has no role in policing a lawyeracademic’s statement of what the law should be,107 but has a valid interest
in a lawyer-academic’s ability to accurately identify a statement of what
the law actually is. A lawyer-academic who routinely misstates the law in
their research and teaching may potentially return to practice and do so in
advising clients. Moreover, incompetent instruction of law students may
contribute to incompetence of future lawyers.
The existing rules of professional conduct recognize that lawyers,
even in their extraprofessional conduct, can damage public respect for
the administration of justice, whether through incivility or otherwise.
The consensus in the Canadian legal ethics community appears to be that
law societies should largely avoid engaging with or regulating lawyers’
conduct outside the practice of law, whether because such regulation is
illegitimate or because scarce resources should be used to protect the
public from the more tangible harms of practicing lawyers’ professional
conduct.108 A competing minority view is that non-practicing lawyers,
such as lawyer-politicians, are some of the highest-profile lawyers in the
country and their misconduct reflect negatively on, and indeed undermines
public confidence in, the legal profession.109 The official position of
law societies, as embodied in the rules of professional conduct, is that
while “dishonourable” or “questionable” conduct outside practice is the
legitimate target of professional discipline, they are “generally” concerned
with extraprofessional conduct that goes to “professional integrity.”110
Thus, even if the ability and willingness to comply with the duty of
civility and the duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice
can easily and deliberately be turned on and off, such noncompliance by

107. But see Quebec Code, supra note 30 (“[a] lawyer must support respect for the rule of law.
However, he may, for good reason and by legitimate means, criticize a legal provision, contest the
interpretation or application thereof, or seek to have it repealed, amended or replaced” at s 12).
108. See e.g. Alice Woolley, “Legal Ethics and Regulatory Legitimacy: Regulating Lawyers For
Personal Misconduct” in Reid Mortensen, Francesca Bartlett & Kieran Tranter, eds, Alternative
Perspectives on Lawyers and Legal Ethics: Reimagining the Profession (New York: Routledge, 2011)
241; Martin, “Limits,” supra note 6 (“[l]aw societies should have better things to do” at 172, quoting
Adam Dodek).
109. Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Legal Ethics versus Political Practices: The Application of the Rules
of Professional Conduct to Lawyer-Politicians” (2013) 91:1 Can Bar Rev 1 at 30 [Martin, “Political”];
Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Consequences for Broken Political Promises: Lawyer-Politicians and the
Rules of Professional Conduct” (2016) 10:2 JPPL 337 at 345 online: <digitalcommons.schulichlaw.
dal.ca/scholarly_works/91/> [perma.cc/425J-Q3GG] (I am not only in the minority on this point—as
far as I can tell, I am the minority).
110. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 2.1-1, commentaries 3 and 4.
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lawyer-academics is of legitimate present concern, not just future concern,
for law societies. Moreover, teaching and research by lawyer-academics is
practice-adjacent. It is the closest that extraprofessional conduct can come
to professional conduct. Thus, of all extraprofessional conduct, teaching
and research by lawyer-academics is most indicative of professional
conduct and most worthy of regulation by law societies. Thus, if there
is any extraprofessional conduct that law societies should regulate, it is
teaching and research by lawyer-academics.
The ability of universities to discipline lawyer-academics in their
capacity as academics is no substitute for law society discipline of lawyeracademics in their capacity as lawyers. This reality is another clear parallel
to Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, in which the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the potential for a Crown Attorney to face employment
consequences for her conduct was no substitute for law society discipline.111
Just as the Attorney General can end the career of a Crown Attorney but
cannot prevent them from continuing to practice law in another context,112
universities can arguably end the academic careers of lawyer-academics
but cannot stop them from returning to the practice of law. Conversely,
the authority and responsibility of law societies to discipline lawyeracademics in their capacity as non-practicing lawyers by no means
precludes their discipline by other authorities in other capacities.113 Thus,
for example, universities remain free (subject to collective agreements
and other constraints) to discipline lawyer-academics in their capacity as
members of the university community. Indeed, some kinds of misconduct,
such as academic dishonesty, may not only legitimately but necessarily
trigger consequences under both regimes.
The concern over the best use of scarce law society resources,114 i.e.
that law society resources may be diverted from addressing the more
tangible and immediate harms done by practicing lawyers, is a legitimate
one. However, that concern calls for prudence, not abdication. Moreover,
the relatively limited number of lawyer-academics in Canada (as compared
for example to the US) suggests that any regulation would not excessively
detract from other regulatory priorities.
I acknowledge the existential concern that law societies may assert
their authority over lawyer-academics in order to indirectly exert undue
111. Krieger, supra note 104.
112. Ibid at para 58.
113. See by analogy Wilder v Ontario Securities Commission (2001), 53 OR (3d) 519, 197 DLR (4th)
193 (CA).
114. Martin, “Limits,” supra note 6 (“[l]aw societies should have better things to do” at 172, quoting
Adam Dodek).
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control over the legal academy and legal education. However, while such
regulation may complicate and perhaps require recalibration of the tension
or balance between law societies and the legal academy over control of
legal education, that is not a sufficient basis for law societies to leave their
mandates unfulfilled.
2. The positive effects of law society regulation on teaching and
research by lawyer-academics outweigh any negative effects
The potential positive effects of law society regulation have been discussed
above. First, the rules on competence, the duty to encourage respect for the
administration of justice, and the duty of civility constrain teaching and
research that is objectively incorrect, “petty,” “intemperate,” intellectually
dishonest, or “irresponsible.”115 These are attributes of low-value teaching
and research. To the extent that law society regulation constrains such
conduct, it improves teaching and research. Second, modelling professional
conduct is an important component of legal teaching (and research). Law
society regulation of lawyer-academics promotes such modelling.
The potential negative impacts of law society regulation on teaching
and research by lawyer-academics are important considerations but
ultimately manageable. There are two main potential negative effects.
One is that law society regulation may be abused to inappropriately target
lawyer-academics. The second and most important potential negative
impact is a chilling effect on teaching and research by lawyer-academics
and the risk that that chilling effect will drive legal academics out of the
profession or discourage them from joining the profession in the first place.
The risks of law society regulation being co-opted to inappropriately
target lawyer-academics are real but manageable ones. I recognize that the
regulatory jurisdiction of law societies risks being harnessed for retribution
against lawyer-academics, parallel to its harnessing for retribution against
lawyer-politicians,116 be it by the subjects of their criticism, disgruntled
students, grandstanding politicians, or merely those who disagree. I also
recognize the potential apprehension that law societies might abuse their
powers to retaliate or threaten retaliation against law professors who
criticize the law societies themselves. There are two safeguards against
these risks. The first is the ability of law societies and their discipline
counsel to adopt robust processes to filter and divert at least most of the
frivolous, malicious, tactical, or otherwise abusive complaints received.
The possibility for disgruntled or dissatisfied students or other academics
or lawyers to abuse the process does not negate the positive and necessary
115. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 5.6-1, commentary 3.1.
116. See e.g. Martin, “Political,” supra note 109 at 23.
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role for investigations and discipline proceedings in other circumstances.
The second safeguard is the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior courts
through judicial review.
Perhaps the most important potential negative impact is a chilling
effect on teaching and research by lawyer-academics and the risk that that
chilling effect will drive legal academics out of the profession or discourage
them from joining the profession in the first place. In 2016 I proposed this
second effect as a solution for non-practicing lawyers who found their
professional obligations constraining their activities as lawyer-politicians
or lawyer-pundits: “The easy solution is for these non-practising lawyers to
resign their licences …—but preferably before engaging in the prohibited
conduct.”117 While admittedly somewhat glib, I did at least acknowledge
that such a solution might be undesirable insofar as it “may discourage
lawyers from using their skills and knowledge to serve in valuable roles as
commentators, politicians or academics. Movement among these roles and
the practising bar and the judiciary may be desirable.”118
Any chilling effect, and this simplistic solution to it, is problematic
because there is value in at least some law professors being licensed
lawyers, as opposed for example to simply holding degrees in law or having
practiced before surrendering their licenses to teach. One might argue that
they make better law teachers.119 Beyond that, however, lawyer-academics
at least sometimes may achieve, promote, or fulfill the aspirations or
duties of the legal profession better than practicing lawyers. For example,
practicing lawyers may be more reluctant to criticize judicial appointments,
even though such criticism can be consistent with—and indeed fulfill—the
duty to encourage respect for and improve the administration of justice.
Perhaps understandably, all but the bravest lawyer-academics, in all but
the most extreme circumstances, are adamant to emphasize that they are
criticizing the appointments process and not specific appointments.120
117. Martin, “Limits,” supra note 6 at 172.
118. Ibid.
119. In the US literature see e.g. Amy B Cohen, “The Dangers of the Ivory Tower: The Obligation
of Law Professors to Engage in the Practice of Law” (2004) 50:3 Loyola L Rev 623 online:
<digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol/58/> [perma.cc/45LM-HH68]; James M Dente, “Need
for More Professors Who Have Practiced Law” (1969) 18 Clev-Marshall L Rev 252 online:
<engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/> [perma.cc/7895-USTP]; Martin H Pritikin, “The Experiential
Sabbatical” (2014) 64:1 J Leg Educ 33 <jle.aals.org/home/vol64/iss1/4/> [perma.cc/7CYS-JA4U];
Suzanne Rabe & Stephen A Rosenbaum, “A Sending Down Sabbatical: The Benefits of Lawyering in
the Legal Services Trenches” (2010) 60:2 J Leg Educ 296 <jle.aals.org/home/vol60/iss2/7/> [perma.
cc/E42E-TEBE]; Edward D Re, “Law Office Sabbaticals for Law Professors” (1995) 45:1 J Leg
Educ 95; Emily Zimmerman, “Should Law Professors Have a Continuing Practice Experience (CPE)
Requirement” (2013) 6:1 Northeastern U LJ 131.
120. See e.g. Richard Devlin & Adam Dodek, “The Achilles Heel of the Canadian Judiciary: The
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Thus Richard Devlin and Adam Dodek characterize appointments as “the
Achilles heel of the Canadian judiciary”, but only directly question the
merits of one such appointment.121 For example, the only public criticism
of a 2011 elevation of a judge from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to
the Supreme Court of Canada came from two lawyer-academics, both of
the Ontario Bar: Allan Hutchinson of Osgoode Hall and Jacob Ziegel of
the University of Toronto—and even Ziegel would comment only on the
process, albeit in stark terms.122 From this perspective, lawyer-academics
have a greater ability than practicing lawyers to fulfill lawyers’ duties,
specifically to improve the administration of justice through legitimate but
controversial criticism.
This paradox can be explained in economic terms, though I would not
reduce it to such terms. In the US context, Kuehn characterizes lawyeracademics as having special “economic freedom”—“by not having the
same worries as practicing lawyers about offending paying clients or
taking positions that might be viewed as conflicting with those of a current
client.”123 He further argues that such economic freedom imposes a “duty
to pursue justice.”124
Ethics of Judicial Appointments in Canada” 20:1 Legal Ethics 43 at 58, 59; Hugo Cyr, “The Bungling
of Justice Nadon’s Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 67:3 SCLR 73 online:
<digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol67/iss1/3/> [perma.cc/TEK3-EDEQ].
121. Devlin & Dodek, supra note 120 at 58, 59-62.
122. Kirk Makin, “PM taps Ontario judges Karakatsanis, Moldaver for Supreme Court,” The Globe
and Mail (17 October 2011), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/pm-taps-ontariojudges-karakatsanis-moldaver-for-supreme-court/article557785/> [perma.cc/2BZV-HXMX]; Kirk
Makin, “Nominees’ ordeal likely to be tough, but not adversarial,” The Globe and Mail (11 October
2011) A4, 2011 WLNR 21320517: “What I seriously question is the integrity of the process that led
to [the judge’s] nomination.” See also more recent and more pointed criticism of other elevations by
lawyer-academics: John Whyte, “Russell Brown doesn’t belong on the Supreme Court,” The Toronto
Star (18 August 2015), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2015/08/18/russell-browndoesnt-belong-on-the-supreme-court.html> [perma.cc/7J54-C7D8]; Leslie MacKinnon, “What the
new Supreme Court of Canada judge brings to top court,” iPolitics (2 July 2021), online: <ipolitics.
ca/2021/07/02/what-the-new-supreme-court-of-canada-judge-brings-to-top-court/> [perma.cc/6AU95F6X] quoting Joshua Sealy-Harrington; Joshua Sealy-Harrington, “As an aside, I’ll note that my
comment about Canada being “replete” with “brilliant and thoughtful” racialized lawyers (left image)
is not quite what I said. My full comment re *Indigenous* jurists (right image) differs and warrants
particular emphasis in the current moment” (6 July 2021 at 13:21 PM), online: Twitter <mobile.twitter.
com/JoshuaSealy/status/1412446606855655431>. But see also by a practicing lawyer on the elevation
of Justice Mahmud Jamal to the Supreme Court of Canada: Riaz Sayani, “The Politics of Judging Our
Judges,” The Toronto Star (27 July 2021), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2021/07/27/
the-politics-of-judging-our-judges.html> [perma.cc/GE5N-6VKW].
123. Kuehn, supra note 4 at 267-296. See also Byrne, supra note 4 (“[l]aw professors also bear
obligations to society greater than those of scholars in purer disciplines. We have been given the
niche from which to observe the legal system without being beholden to competing interest groups
or clients” at 329). See also McPeak, supra note 9 (“[l]aw professors who are not actively practicing
law face greater flexibility to discuss real cases and issues without fearing that they will breach
confidentiality or other duties to clients” at 217, n 103).
124. Kuehn, supra note 4 at 296. See also Byrne, supra note 4 (“[s]urely we [law professors] should
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Here I distinguish between past legal education and experience, on
the one hand, and current membership in a provincial or territorial bar,
on the other. A legal education is doubtlessly useful for politicians,
commentators, and journalists, among others, and arguably indispensable
for law professors. Likewise past practice experience. But it is not obvious
that current membership in a bar is necessary or even advantageous for
politicians, commentators, and journalists. Indeed, the constraints of
professional obligations may impede their performance of their chosen
roles.125 The same might even be true for academics outside law schools,
such as political scientists. In contrast, insofar as the role of the law school
is at least partly to train and prepare future lawyers, there is a benefit in at
least some law school faculty not just being legally trained but also being
current lawyers—even if I am wrong and that status does indeed constrain
their academic freedom to pursue the mission of the university. I also
note that former lawyer-academics often make significant contributions
as members of the judiciary. Such appointments require membership in
the bar.
However, insofar as I am correct that law society regulation
constrains—and is seen to constrain—only low-value teaching and
research, this chilling effect should be minimal.
While I recognize that law society regulation of lawyer-academics is
by definition a double standard,126 that double standard is not inherently
problematic—that is, it is not a negative effect. Lawyer academics face
constraints not applicable to their non-lawyer colleagues in the law school
or to their colleagues in other parts of the university. Those law professors
(and other professors) who are not lawyers will not be constrained by law
society regulation, while those who are lawyers will be so constrained.
As I have argued, however, law society regulation constrains low-value
teaching and scholarship. In this way, it is an additional mechanism
to enforce what is essentially the same standard that applies to all law
professors and may indeed promote higher-quality teaching and research.
The narrow if not non-existent range of legitimate academic views that
cannot be expressed by lawyer-academics can instead be expressed by their
non-lawyer colleagues in law schools—or elsewhere in the university. If
anything, the double standard thus diversifies teaching and research.
devote effort to public education about the legal system, such as through expert testimony, journalism,
or media appearances, to law reform, or to representation of unrepresented persons or viewpoints” at
329).
125. Martin, “Limits,” supra note 6 at 172.
126. See by analogy Martin, “Political,” supra note 109 at 20-23 (double standard as between lawyerpoliticians and non-lawyer politicians).
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3. On balance: yes they should
Given my analysis in Part II, responsible and responsive regulation
of lawyer-academics by law societies, including but not limited to the
enforcement of the rules of professional conduct, should improve research
and teaching. In this context, law societies should strive to provide clarity
and predictability to lawyer-academics about the manner in which this
legal authority will be exercised. This brings me to my recommendations.
V. Recommendations (responses and solutions)
In this article, I have identified the present uncertainty around law
society regulation of the teaching and research of lawyer-academics and
considered the legal and policy questions involved. In this Part, I conclude
my analysis by considering potential responses to the current situation.
As always, one potential response is for law societies to do nothing,
i.e. to perpetuate the current uncertainty, and for lawyer-academics to
continue on as before. However, this option is arguably the least helpful.
Uncertainty over potential law society regulation has its own chilling effect
separate from that of actual regulation. Indeed, uncertainty is potentially
the greatest chilling effect. At the same time, it is certainly the one most
amenable to amelioration. Whether Canadian law societies choose to take
an active role or a hands-off role in the teaching and research of Canadian
lawyer-academics, those lawyer-academics and their teaching and research
would benefit from a clear articulation of that chosen role. To date, the law
societies have had said little about academic freedom and related issues.
Perhaps the closest that Canadian law societies have come to recognizing
academic freedom is a brief passage in a single report of the Canadian
Common Law Degree task force of the Federation of Law Societies of
Canada:
Law societies respect the academic freedom that law schools vigorously
defend. There is a strong tradition within the legal education system,
particularly in North America, to view law school education as not
simply a forum for training individuals to become practitioners of a
profession, but also as an intellectual pursuit that positions its graduates
to play myriad roles in and make valuable contributions to society …
The Task Force believes that its recommendations balance law societies’
regulatory responsibilities with the importance of academic freedom and
learning in law schools.127

127. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Task Force on the Canadian Common Law Degree:
Final Report: October 2009 (Ottawa: FLSC, 2009) at 18, 25, online (pdf): <flsc.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/admission8.pdf> [perma.cc/9B6A-TPDU].
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I encourage the law societies in common-law jurisdictions, potentially
through the Federation of Law Societies of Canada, and the Barreau de
Quebec to develop and publicize a clear policy on these issues—one that
would guide not only lawyer-academics but also law society investigatory
and disciplinary personnel and disciplinary adjudicators. In so doing,
they should consult widely and engage stakeholders such as the Canadian
Association of Law Teachers, the Canadian Association of University
Teachers, the Council of Canadian Law Deans, and the Canadian Bar
Association and its member branches. To ensure the public interest and the
views of the general public are adequately considered, lay benchers should
be particularly involved in this process. An amendment to the rules of
professional conduct, however, seems unnecessary. If the legislatures do
not agree with the approach that the law societies adopt, they are of course
free to amend the legislation governing the legal profession. However,
such legislative action is undesirable insofar as it would detract from the
independence of the bar.
In my view, it is hypocritical and elitist for lawyer-academics to hold
themselves to, or be held to, a lesser standard than the one that the future
holds for their students. There is no credible argument that breaches
of competence or civility are necessary to high-value teaching and
research. Neither do I believe that lawyer-academics require the ability
to breach the duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice.
Nonetheless, if I am incorrect and there is pedagogical or epistemic value,
or both, in lawyer-academics having greater latitude to criticize lawyers
and judges than have practicing lawyers, then legislatures, law society
decision-makers, or courts could deliberately provide lawyer-academics
with special protection against law society discipline for their teaching
and research activities. The clearest options would be outright immunity
or a special defence somewhat akin to the common-law “responsible
journalism” defence against a defamation claim.128 In the alternative,
law societies could merely make a policy decision not to enforce or to
deprioritize the enforcement of the rules of professional conduct against
lawyer-academics in the context of their teaching and research, whether
generally or specifically as to criticism of the administration of justice.
While the law societies, by making such a policy choice, would potentially
be fettering their own discretion and thus potentially be vulnerable to a
legal challenge in the nature of mandamus, I assume they would do so
only because there are legitimate and compelling public interest reasons
for such an approach.
128. See e.g. Grant v Torstar Corporation, 2008 ONCA 796.

548 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Despite the importance of law societies regulating not just practicing
lawyers but lawyer-academics, practice-adjacent as they are, law societies
may, for many potential reasons, not pursue this part of their role as a
regulatory priority. Even so, I would argue that lawyer-academics
should make good-faith and sincere efforts to comply with the rules of
professional conduct, both in letter and spirit as the rules themselves
require,129 regardless of the realistic potential for law society discipline.
Another response to these regulatory incentives and any purportedly
compelling need for law professors to criticize the administration of
justice in a manner and to an extent that is impermissible for lawyers
would be for some minimal proportion of law professors to not become
lawyers or to surrender their licenses. However, while there may be an
advantage to some law professors not being lawyers, my view remains that
most high-quality teaching and research will be achieved only if some, if
not most, law professors are lawyers. Any valuable teaching and research
that is constrained by the prospect of law society regulation can, in the
alternative, be allocated to academics in philosophy and political science
that are unconstrained by such regulation. By no means do I suggest that
such academics are superior or inferior to lawyer-academics; instead, I
simply emphasize that they are subject to different constraints on their
teaching and research.
Conclusion
In this article, I have examined the interplay between the professional
obligations of lawyer-academics and academic freedom by canvassing
the legal and policy questions around whether law societies can and
should regulate the teaching and research activities of their members
in the academy. Both the legal uncertainty and the policy uncertainty
have an unnecessary and remediable chilling effect. Even if the current
academic consensus is correct that law societies should not generally
regulate extraprofessional misconduct, there is a strong argument that
teaching and research warrant regulation. The relevant professional duties
of lawyers, presuming their nuances are appreciated, do not necessarily
impede academic freedom—at least not in a meaningful and undesirable
way. At most, the constraints imposed by the rules of professional conduct
promote higher-value research and teaching by impeding low-value
129. FLSC Model Code, supra note 30, r 3.1.1, definition of “competent lawyer.” While the text
refers to professional conduct and not extraprofessional conduct—“complying in letter and spirit with
all rules pertaining to the appropriate professional conduct of lawyers” [emphasis added]—lawyeracademics should refrain from a formalistic interpretation of their duty to meet the spirit of the rules
of professional conduct.
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academic expression in the form of criticism or other statements that are
petty, insincere, unsupported, intemperate, or incorrect. Thus, law societies
can fulfill their regulatory mandates without meaningfully impairing the
teaching and research of lawyer-academics.
While I recognize that, despite my analysis here, it remains unlikely
that law societies will actively regulate lawyer-academics, mere inaction
or passivity is insufficient to address the issues I have raised. Instead,
law societies should actively and publicly clarify their approach to the
regulation of teaching and research by lawyer-academics sooner than later,
so that careful consideration is not precluded by immediacy when such
circumstances arise, and so that lawyer-academics can benefit from at least
some degree of transparency, certainty, and predictability.
Moreover, university administrations and faculty associations
should recognize that lawyer-academics are vulnerable to these kinds
of professional complaints and proceedings, valid or not, as a direct
consequence of their responsibilities and duties to the university. They
should thus consider negotiating provisions in their collective agreements
that would provide insurance for representation in these matters, parallel
to defamation insurance. Even where current provisions may implicitly
provide for this protection, explicit language would increase transparency
and confidence among faculty.
In the meantime, and regardless of law societies’ eventual position on
these questions, lawyer-academics should risk any impulse to surrender
their licenses to simplify their situations and become unconstrained in their
teaching and research activities. They should instead embrace and strive to
comply with their professional obligations and model that compliance to
their students both in their teaching and their research. It may indeed make
them better teachers and scholars.
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